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Antisuit Injunctions Under the Complex 
Litigation Proposal: Harmonizing the Sirens' 
Song of Efficiency and Fairness with the Hymn 
of Judicial Federalism and Comity 
Travelling along the western coast of Italy, ancient 
voyagers confkonted a subtle danger embodied in alluring form: 
the Sirens. Sweetly singing their seductive song, the Sirens 
compelled all who heard their sound to draw near their reef- 
surrounded isle.' Those succumbing to the Sirens' song 
perished as their boats were wrecked on the submerged reefs 
surrounding the island. Others escaped this fate, however, 
either by countering the Sirens' song with equally compelling 
strains of their own or by blocking off the sound itself. 
Although the Sirens and their song are no longer heard, a 
new sirens' song has sounded forth with the recent adoption of 
the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Pr~posa l .~  
Surveying the morass of modern complex litigation, the 
Institute trills forth its song, more calm and calculatedly logical 
than sweet and seductive, promising efficiency and fair- 
ness-with concomitant benefits for all-through consolidation 
of complex cases. Rather than leading to their destruction, 
those giving heed to this modern sirens' song are lulled into 
abandoning or subordinating to concerns of efficiency and 
1. Historic accounts and drawings suggest that the Sirens were sort of an 
aquatic Madonna. Cf: ANNA RUSSELL, The Ring of the Nibelungs (An Analysis), on 
T H E  ANNA RUSSELL ALBUM (Sony Masterworks 1972) (describing Wagner's Rhine 
Maidens as "aquatic Andrews Sisters"). 
2. In 1985, the Institute commissioned the Preliminary Study on Complex 
Litigation. The study focused its efforts on two basic issues: (i) whether the 
Institute's efforts could actually alleviate problems associated with complex 
litigation; and (ii) how the problems of complex litigation potentially could be 
assuaged. This preliminary study developed into THE COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, the final draft of which was adopted by the American Law Institute in 
1994. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDA- 
TIONS AM) ANALYSIS 1 (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL]. 
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fairness other values implicated by complex litigation, 
including the principles of comity and federalism. 
One area in which the tug of efficiency and fairness is 
strongly felt is in the Complex Litigation Proposal's Antisuit 
Injunction provision, section 5.04. Under this section, a federal 
transferee court3 may automatically enjoin ongoing state court 
proceedings whenever an injunction would "foster the overall 
objectives of [the] pr~posal."~ Through linking issuance of 
injunctions to furtherance of the Proposal's efficiency and 
fairness objectives, the Proposal implicitly ignores two 
principles traditionally restraining issuance of otherwise proper 
injunctions: comity and federalism. Because an antisuit 
injunction will so frequently be necessary-or at  least seem 
so-to facilitate consolidation and to achieve a satisfactory level 
of efficiency and fairness, the failure to expressly include 
considerations of comity and federalism in the calculus 
governing issuance of an injunction will directly result in their 
subordination. Although the Proposal Reporter reassuringly 
states that considerations of comity and federalism have their 
place in the calculus, the Proposal's "blackletter" rules 
governing injunctions fail to account for either principle. This 
Comment proposes to remedy this deficiency by offering a 
decisional framework accounting for both efficiency-fairness 
and comity-federalism considerations. 
Harmonizing the Proposal's efficiency-fairness objectives 
with federalism-comity principles, which underlie the 
traditional federal court reluctance to issue injunctions, avoids 
the evils of adhering solely to either an efficiency-fairness 
based or a comity-federalism based regime. On the one hand, a 
strictly comity-federalism based regime, operating to severely 
restrain injunctions, would h s t r a t e  legitimate attempts to 
alleviate the patent systemic, individual, and societal ills posed 
by modern complex litigation. On the other hand, a strictly 
efficiency-fairness based regime, operating to freely issue 
injunctions, would strike at  fundamental values preserved by 
the restraints comity and federalism impose on enjoining state 
court proceedings. Harmonizing of the sirens' song of efficiency 
3. Although 5 5.04 applies to federal and some state transferee courts, this 
Comment will focus solely on federal transferee courts operating under this 
provision. 
4. See COMPLEX L ~ G A T I O N  PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04 reporter's notes 
to cmt. c at 271. 
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and fairness with the hymn of judicial comity and federalism 
would not only avoid such unfortunate results, but also result 
in a beneficial synthesis of efficiency-fairness and comity- 
federalism objectives. 
The purpose of this Comment is to suggest both the need 
for and methods of attaining harmonization of efficiency- 
fairness objectives with comity-federalism principles. First , this 
Comment will review the two competing considerations, 
highlighting that both represent equally weighty and 
consequently valid concerns. Second, this Comment will 
suggest how the Proposal's current framework may be adapted 
to account for both sets of considerations through an exercise of 
principled discretion. 
As background for those unacquainted with the Complex 
Litigation Proposal, part I1 provides a brief overview of the 
Proposal, including a discussion of the problems sought to be 
alleviated through consolidation, an analysis of the proposed 
methods for achieving consolidation, and a summary of the 
efficiency and fairness policies furthered by consolidation. Part 
I11 reviews the interrelation between the Anti-Injunction Act 
and the Antisuit Injunction provision, surveying the operation 
of each. Part IV proposes a method by which federal transferee 
courts may harmonize efficiency-fairness objectives with the 
principles of comity and federalism through a principled 
exercise of their equitable discretion when issuing injunctions. 
Lastly, Part V concludes that, because equally weighty 
considerations support adherence to the efficiency-fairness 
objectives of the Proposal as well as the comity-federalism 
principles underlying the Anti-Injunction Act, a federal 
transferee court must actively seek to reconcile the two through 
a principled use of its equitable discretion. 
Over the past several decades, a new style of litigation has 
emerged onto the American legal scene. Courts and 
commentators have descriptively named it "complex litigation." 
Such litigation is typified by multiple parties filing an 
assortment of related claims in various f ~ r a . ~  Responding to 
5. For the working definition of "complex litigation" adopted by the American 
Law Institute in its COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, see infia part 1I.A. 
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this development and the problems perceived to arise out of 
complex litigation, the American Law Institute undertook an 
investigation of complex litigation that has resulted in both a 
full review of this area of the law and a proposal for statutory 
reformd In 1988, the Institute commissioned the Complex 
Litigation Proposal7 after concluding that the Institute could 
assist in resolving problems of complex litigation? During the 
next five years, the Proposal investigated and developed broad- 
based proposals to resolve the various problems posed by 
complex l i t igat i~n.~ In 1993, the results of the Proposal's 
efforts were submitted to and approved by the general 
membership of the American Law Institute. 
This section will summarize the efforts of the Complex 
Litigation Proposal, presenting first an analysis of what types 
of cases "complex litigation" comprehends and the impact such 
6. See supra note 2. 
7. Throughout the remainder of the text of this Comment the Complex 
Litigation Proposal will be referred to as either "the Proposal" or "the Complex 
Litigation Proposal." 
8. The Proposal viewed its efforts as embracing three specific goals: (i) 
understanding the nature of lawsuits involving multiple parties; (ii) identifying the 
distinctive features of such lawsuits; and (iii) providing the Institute with 
techniques for alleviating the problems such lawsuits create. COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at  3. 
9. The Proposal conducted its efforts in three discrete phases. First, the 
Proposal examined in greater depth the problems posed by modern complex 
litigation and developed suggestions for transferring and consolidating related 
complex cases within the federal system. Next, the Proposal developed transferal 
and consolidation techniques for related complex cases arising in both federal and 
state courts. Lastly, the Proposal developed proposals for consolidating related 
complex cases in a state court forum, including the transfer of federal cases into a 
state transferee forum, and a proposed federal choice of law code to be applied 
when cases were consolidated in a federal court. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, 
supra note 2, at  1-2. For an examination of the proposed transfer and consolidation 
procedures, see infia part 1I.B. 
The Proposal developed these procedural proposals against the backdrop of the 
following goals: 
First, basic principles of federalism and their implications as to the 
respective roles of state and federal courts must be respected. Second, 
new business should not be added to federal court dockets without a 
demonstrated need for doing so. . . . Third, and perhaps most important, 
the fundamental procedural rights of litigants must not be compromised. 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at  5-6. Some have suggested that 
the Proposal has failed to reconcile its proposals with these goals. See, e.g., 
Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Eficiency and Discretion over Competing Complex 
Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 278-79 (1991) (suggesting that the proposals 
set forth in the Complex Litigation Proposal permit efficiency principles to triumph 
over competing values such as federalism and litigant fairness). 
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litigation has on the parties, the judicial system, and society in 
general. The discussion then turns to both an analysis of the 
procedural reforms that the Institute has adopted and a review 
of the policies served by the Proposal's reforms. 
A. Background: Problems Posed by Modern Complex 
Litigation 
Although the term "complex litigation" is broad enough to 
include a variety of concepts,10 as used in the Proposal, the 
term "refers exclusively to multiparty, multiforum litigation . . . 
characterized by related claims dispersed in several forums and 
often involving events that occurred over long periods of 
time."" Litigation falling within the scope of the Proposal's 
definition is not limited to one or a few areas of the law. Rath- 
er, complex litigation may occur in almost any area of substan- 
tive law.12 Although complex cases may result fkom a variety 
of factual scenarios and sound in many different areas of the 
10. "[TJhe term sometimes is used t o  refer to litigation that concerns complex 
issues even if the dispute takes place only between two parties in a single forum." 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at  7. Further, the term would cer- 
tainly also apply to litigation that gives rise to a multitude of claims, crossclaims, 
counterclaims, andlor petitions for intervention or certification of classes or partial 
classes. For an example of how easily litigation embracing all these aspects of 
complexity can spring up, see John H. Lowrie, Note, Air Crash Litigation and 28 
U.S.C. Section 1407: Experience Suggests A Solution, 1981 U .  ILL. L. REV. 927, 
927-28 (describing the "[llarge scale, complex litigation [that] invariably results 
from a commercial air crash"). 
11. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  7; cf. MANUAL FOR COM- 
PLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) @ 20.11, a t  7 (1985) (suggesting a somewhat broader 
scope for "complex litigation"). 
12. Thus, an early congressional investigation concluded that the potential for 
complex litigation arose "not only [in] civil antitrust actions but also, common di- 
saster (air crash) actions, patent and trademark suits, products liability actions and 
securities law violation actions, among others." EMANUEL CELLER, TRANSFER OF 
PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968). After completing its own investigation of complex litiga- 
tion nearly 20 years later, the Proposal reached a similar conclusion: 
Complex cases may arise under state or federal law and in the courts 
of either system. They are generated by a variety of circumstances-from 
a single mass disaster such as the collapse of a Hyatt Hotel skywalk, 
from myriad individual contacts with a hazardous product such as asbes- 
tos, or from allegations of antitrust violations committed by one of the 
world's largest corporations or a number of small ones. 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at  7. For examples of the meaning 
implicated by "complex litigation," see, e-g., In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 
422 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (asbestos litigation); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 
(Mass. 1982) (DES litigation); In re Repetitive Stress Injury Cases, 142 F.R.D. 584 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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law, complex cases share two distinctive features. First, com- 
plex cases involve the litigation of nearly identical issues of law 
in multiple fora. Second, this relitigation of identical issues pro- 
duces wasteful expenditure of judicial, litigant, and societal 
resources.13 These twin aspects of complex litigation (the 
relitigation of similar issues and the concomitant wastehl 
expenditures of limited resources)14 are aggravated by in- 
creased filings of such cases.'' The problems caused by 
relitigation of identical issues and expending limited resources 
may be classified into two broad categories: (i) transactional 
and economic inefficiency, and (ii) litigant injustice? 
First, complex litigation produces transactional and eco- 
nomic inefficiencies affecting not only those directly engaged in 
the complex litigation but also other users of the court system, 
as well as society in general. Massive court filings accompany- 
ing the prosecution of complex cases overburden court dock- 
ets,'? thereby delaying proceedings for those involved with the 
13. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  7; see also Alvin B. Ru- 
bin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 429 (1986) (noting 
that complex litigation "produce[sl high litigation costs . . . affect[ing] not only the 
litigants but other users of the court system; and their . . . costs affect all of soci- 
ety"); Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 
323, 324 (1983) (describing complex cases as involving "costly and repetitive litiga- 
tion"). 
14. [Complex litigation] presents one of the greatest problems our courts 
currently confront. Repeated relitigation of the common issues in a 
complex case unduly expends the resources of attorney and client, 
burdens already overcrowded dockets, delays recompense for those in 
need, results in disparate treatment for persons harmed by essentially 
identical or similar conduct, and contributes to the negative image 
many people have of the legal system. 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  7. 
15. See Rubin, supra note 13, a t  429 (suggesting a variety of factors that 
have produced a "vast increase" in the number of complex cases being filed); see 
also Williams, supra note 13, at  324 ("[Sltate and federal trial judges are being in- 
undated with mass filings of lawsuits by individual plaintiffs . . . . These cases are 
but the harbinger of the judiciary's role in an increasingly complex society . . . ."I. 
16. This descriptive categorization highlights that these problems are the an- 
titheses of the Proposal's overall policy objectives: (i) transactional and economic 
efficiency, and (ii) litigant fairness. See infra part 1I.C. 
17. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239, 240 & n.3 
(S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed sub nom. Schreier v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, 
745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.) (Mem.), mandamus to vacate certification, In re Bendectin 
Prods. 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984). After noting the more than 500 Bendectin 
claims filed and pending in its district alone, a district court calculated that resolu- 
tion of just those claims could last nearly ten years. The court also concluded that 
resolution at  just the trial level of all Bendectin claims might require the equiva- 
lent of "105 Judge years, i.e., one Judge for 105 years or 105 Judges for one year." 
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litigation itself as well as for others who have resorted to the 
judicial system for relief.18 Moreover, the repeated litigation of 
identical issues of law requires the potentially unnecessary, 
and therefore wasted, expenditure of limited judicial, individu- 
al, and societal  resource^.'^ 
Second, resolution of complex cases within the present 
judicial framework frequently produces inequitable results for 
both plaintiffs and defendants. Thus, plaintiffs who have been 
injured by essentially similar defendant conduct may receive 
vastly disparate treatment of their claims as each jurisdiction 
applies its own substantive and procedural rules, as well as its 
own precedents, to resolve the claims.20 Likewise, 
nonconsolidated litigation of similar claims may lead to untime- 
ly bankruptcies of large institutional defendants who are con- 
fronted with "uncoordinated  scramble^"^^ for assets to satisfy 
multiple compensatory and punitive damage awards.22 More- 
over, the delays resulting from complex litigation's transac- 
tional inefficiencies may not have an equal impact on all liti- 
Id. at  240 n.3; cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION at  vii (4th rev. ed. 1977) 
(quoting Chief Justice Earl Warren as observing that absent the coordination of 
civil antitrust litigation in the late 1960s "district court calendars throughout the 
country could well have broken down"). The procedural history of In re Bendectin 
Prods. Liab. Litig. alone suggests the impact that complex cases have on court 
dockets. 
18. See Rubin, supra note 13, a t  429; cf. FED R. CIV. P. 1 (noting that the 
Rules were adopted to promote the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action"). For plaintiffs, delay may affect the value of relief sought. See Marc 
A. Franklin, et al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of 
Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (1961) (noting that delay tends 
to "vitiate" any relief obtained andlor the ability to obtain it); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 20-25. 
19. See Rubin, supra note 13, at  429. Although the precise cost of complex 
litigation is unknown, some have estimated that complex litigation comes with a 
multi-million or even multi-billion dollar price tag. Cf. COMPLEX LITIGATION PRO- 
POSAL, supra note 2, a t  16-18; David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story 
of Asbestos, Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 HAW. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (1986) 
(book review); Williams, supra note 13, a t  328. 
20. See D. HENSLER ET. AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF 
MASS TORTS 48-49 (1985); cf. Paul W. Werner, Comment, The Straits of Stare Deci- 
sis and the Utah Court of Appeals: Navigating the Scylla of Under-Application and 
the Charybdis of Over-Application, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 642 (noting that a 
fundamental principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence is the notion that similarly 
situated litigants should be treated alike). 
21. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal 
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U .  PA. L. REV. 7, 15 (1986). 
22. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11, 656 to 82 B 11,676 
(S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 26, 1982) (initiating bankruptcy proceedings to resolve out- 
standing tort claims). 
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gants. While some parties may be able to await--or actually 
work to delay-the eventual resolution of claims, others may 
not be able to do so.23 Similarly, the absolute cost of litigating 
a claim to final disposition may be so expensive that a party 
forgoes bringing the claim altogetherz4 or is forced to settle 
the claim for much less than it  is 
In sum, the process of adjudicating complex cases within 
the current judicial framework produces not only transactional 
and economic inefficiencies but also litigant injustice, imposing 
a substantial burden on the judicial system, litigants, and soci- 
ety in general. Consideration of the problems presented by 
complex litigation counsels in favor of developing a set of proce- 
dures designed to alleviate such problems. The next section 
explores briefly the efforts of the Complex Litigation Proposal 
to accomplish this task. 
B. Ameliorating Problems Posed by Complex Litigation: A 
Proposed Statutory Response 
After investigating the nature and extent of problems 
posed by modem complex litigation, the Proposal concentrated 
on developing techniques to alleviate those problems. The Pro- 
posal focused solely on developing procedures for adjudicating 
complex litigation rather than on proposing modification of the 
substantive law or on changing jury trial procedures in complex 
cases.26 The remainder of this section summarizes briefly the 
efforts of the Proposal, looking first at the suggested procedures 
for consolidating multiparty, multiforum litigation occurring in 
either the state or federal courts. This section then turns to an 
analysis of the authority provided to courts handling the con- 
solidated litigation and, lastly, this section concludes with an 
overview of the choice of law provisions to be applied by federal 
consolidation courts .27 
23. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 16. Thus, "someone 
who is not wealthy and is seriously injured may find that justice delayed is, in- 
deed, justice denied." Id. 
24. Id. "[Florcing individual litigation of propositions that are true but ex- 
pensive to demonstrate can be tantamount to barring the courthouse doors." Id. 
25. See Franklin et al., supra note 18, at 30 (noting that delay has a "possi- 
ble coercive effect that encourages victims to settle early for less than the full 
value of their claim, rather than to wait indefinitely for trial"). 
26. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 3-6. 
27. For comprehensive treatment of the Proposal's proposals, see id. at  chs. 3- 
6. 
ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS 
1. Consolidation and associated procedures 
In order to achieve its objectives of alleviating the prob- 
lems associated with complex litigation, as well as to promote 
its efficiency and fairness  objective^,^^ the Proposal contem- 
plates consolidating cases involving similar issues that have 
been filed in federal and state courts. The proposed procedures 
provide for three types of consolidation: (i) intrafederal consoli- 
dation, (ii) federal-state intersystem consolidation; and (iii) 
interstate consolidation. Each of these categories will be dis- 
cussed in turn. 
a. Intrafederal consolidation. When separate actions 
have been filed solely within the federal court system, the Pro- 
posal authorizes a proposed Complex Litigation Panel, a judi- 
cial body composed of federal judges, to make the initial deter- 
mination of the amenability of the separate actions to consoli- 
da t i~n .~ '  The Complex Litigation Panel not only makes the 
decision whether to    on solid ate^^ but also, when necessary, 
where to transfer the consolidated cases within the federal 
court system.31 The final decisions of the Complex Litigation 
Panel are not subject to review except by extraordinary 
b. Federal-state intersystem consolidation. When sepa- 
rate actions sharing essentially similar issues of law have been 
filed in both federal and state courts, the Proposal provides the 
Complex Litigation PaneP3 with two alternative methods for 
28. See infra part 1I.C. 
29. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL supra note 2,  5 3.02 (noting the compo- 
sition and duties of the Complex Litigation Panel). For a general discussion of the 
Complex Litigation Panel, including its rationale, implementation, and composition, 
see id. at  62-70. 
30. Id. 4 3.01 (Standard for Consolidation) (providing criteria for determining 
whether separate actions should be consolidated; exempting the United States from 
consolidated proceedings when it is prosecuting antitrust or securities violations). 
Section 3.05 outlines the procedure for bringing a motion for consolidation before 
the Complex Litigation Panel as well as the procedure the Panel follows when 
reviewing such a motion. Id. 5 3.05 (Panel Procedure). In order to prevent "ineffi- 
ciency, delay, and unfairnessn as well as the use of "transfer and consolidation for 
tactical advantage or to avoid unfavorable rules in the transferor court," motions 
for and rulings on consolidation must be made "as soon as possible." Id. 5 3.03. 
(Timing of Transfer and Consolidation) (rules governing the timely making and 
disposition of motions for consolidation). 
31. Id. 5 3.04 (Standard for Determining Where to Transfer Consolidated Ac- 
tions) (providing criteria governing the location(s) to which consolidated actions 
should be transferred). 
32. Id. 5 3.07(a) (Review). 
33. See supra part 1I.B.l.a. 
1050 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW El995 
consolidating the actions.34 On the one hand, the Complex Lit- 
igation panel may transfer most federal actions to a state court 
when certain prerequisites are satisfied.35 On the other hand, 
the Complex Litigation Panel may remove state court actions to 
a federal consolidation court proceeding when the circumstanc- 
es counsel in favor of such removal.36 These Panel decisions 
are non-reviewable by other courts except by extraordinary 
e. Interstate consolidation. Because complex cases are 
increasingly litigated solely in state the Proposal has 
proposed that states develop and adopt a uniform set of proce- 
dures to facilitate the transfer and consolidation of similar 
cases that have been filed in the courts of more than one 
state.39 In order to facilitate the formulation and adoption of 
such procedures, the Proposal has developed a model for states 
to use.40 
34. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 55 4.01, 5.01. Although 
efficient and fair disposition of complex cases filed in state and federal courts 
might be achieved by federalizing such cases, the Proposal rejected this method for 
achieving its efficiency and fairness objectives. Id. at  217-18. 
35. Id. 5 4.01 (Designating a State Court as a Transferee Forum for Federal 
Actions) (providing rules governing consolidation and transfer of federal actions in 
state courts). Section 4.01 provides that a transfer of federal actions should only 
occur when (i) a state court presents a superior forum for adjudicating the claims; 
(ii) the transfer will promote litigant fairness and the "interests of justice"; and (iii) 
events giving rise to the litigation occurred in that state and related litigation is 
located in the courts of the state. Id. Moreover, the "appropriate judicial authority" 
of the state must consent to the transfer. Id. Section 4.01 also provides that cer- 
tain cases may not be transferred to state courts, including state cases removed to 
federal court, civil rights claims, and claims brought in or removed to federal court 
by the United States. Id. 
36. Id. 8 5.01 (Removal Jurisdiction) (providing criteria for consolidation of 
actions pending in state court and removal to federal court; prohibiting removal 
when parties and state judge object; authorizing removal of issues as well as whole 
claims; and permitting a state party to exempt itself from removal). A motion for 
removal may be made either by a party in the state proceedings or by the state 
court. Id. 5 5.01(e). For the procedure for presenting and ruling on a motion for 
removal, see id. 5 5.02 (Removal Procedure). 
37. Id. 5 3.07(a). 
38. This is due, in part, to the narrow scope of federal diversity jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (requirement of com- 
plete diversity); 28 U.S.C. 5 1332(a) (1988) (amount in controversy). 
39. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, (55 2, 4.02 (Formulation of 
an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact or a Uniform Complex Litigation Act) 
("[Tlo facilitate the transfer and consolidation of related litigation pending in the 
courts of different states . . . consideration should be given to the formulation of 
an Interstate . . . Compact or . . . Act."). 
40. Id. app. B a t  455. In essence, the Proposal suggests that states adopt 
procedures similar to those used for intrafederal consolidation. See supra part 
ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS 
2. Transferee court authority 
After consolidation is ordered, the actions are transferred 
to an appropriate transferee court for litigation. In order to 
promote efficient handling of the consolidated action, the Pro- 
posal provides transferee courts with additional powers, supple- 
menting the general authority possessed by all courts.41 
Transferee courts are granted authority to manage and orga- 
nize all aspects of the consolidated proceedings, including class 
certification and issue severance. Further, transferee courts 
enjoy both augmented personal jurisdiction over parties42 and 
subject matter jurisdiction over consolidated and transaction- 
ally related claims." Both federal transferee courts and state 
transferee courts to which federal cases have been transferred 
possess the authority to enjoin other proceedings that threaten 
to interfere with the disposition of the consolidated actions.44 
Lastly, federal transferee courts may notify certain nonparties 
that they not only have the right to intervene in the consolidat- 
ed action but also will be bound by its deter~ninations.~~ 
3. Choice of law provisions 
When consolidated actions have been transferred to a fed- 
eral transferee court, the Proposal has developed a federal 
choice of law code to facilitate disposition of the consolidated 
1I.B. 1.a. 
41. Note, however, that the Proposal does not provide that all transferee 
courts will enjoy the same powers. The scope of a transferee court's supplemental 
powers depends on the type of court and the type of claims being transferred to it. 
Thus, a federal transferee court disposing either of federal, see, e.g., id. at  ch. 
3 (intrafederal consolidation), or removed state cases, see, e.g., id. 5 5.01 (removal), 
enjoys all the powers described in $5 3 and 5, see, e.g., id. $5 3.06 (general pow- 
ers), 3.08 (personal jurisdiction), 5.03 (supplemental jurisdiction), 5.04 (antisuit 
injunctions), 5.05 (notice and preclusion). 
A state transferee court adjudicating "remanded" federal cases, see, e.g., id. 
8 4.01 (consolidation in state court), possesses essentially a11 the powers of a feder- 
al transferee court except for the powers of notice and preclusion. 
However, a state court that is exclusively adjudicating consolidated cases trans- 
ferred from different state courts possesses only those powers conferred on it under 
an interstate litigation compact. 
42. Id. $ 3.08 (Personal Jurisdiction in the Transferee Court). 
43. Id. 5 5.03 (Supplemental Jurisdiction). 
44. Id. 5 5.04 (Antisuit Injunctions); see also infia parts III.B., IV. 
45. Id. 5 5.05 (Court-Ordered Notice of Intervention and Preclusion). 
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claims.46 This choice of law code provides rules governing both 
procedural47 as well as substantive aspects of adjudicat i~n.~~ 
C. Policies Advanced by the Complex Litigation Proposal 
Several important public policy considerations are arguably 
advanced through the process of consolidating complex cases 
developed and advocated by the Complex Litigation Propos- 
al.49 Although these policies may be phrased in a variety of 
ways, they may be classified in two general categories: (i) effi- 
ciency interests; and (ii) litigant fairness interests?' 
First, systematic application of the procedures for consoli- 
dating cases would produce increased transactional efficiencies 
that, in turn, would generate economic benefits. Combining 
cases which share identical issues in a single forum fosters 
greater convenience and economy of judicial and litigant ef- 
f o r t ~ . ~ ~  Further, consolidation reduces the aggregate judicial 
46. Id. ch. 6 (Choice of Law); Fred I. Williams, Comment, The Complex Liti- 
gation Pmject's Choice of Law Rules for Mass Torts and How to Escape From 
Them, 1995 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1081. 
47. See, id. 5 6.04 (statutes of limitations for state law claims). 
48. See, id. 99 6.01, 6.08 (conflicts of laws provisions governing which sub- 
stantive law applies to resolve issues of liability sounding in tort or contract in 
consolidated cases); id. $5 6.05-6.06 (conflicts of laws provisions governing awards 
of general and punitive damages). 
49. See id. ch. 2.; see also Peter J .  Kalis, et al., The Choice of Law Dispute 
in Comprehensive Environmental Coverage Litigation: Has Help Arrived from the 
American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project?, 54 LA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1994) 
(noting efficiency-based objectives of the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL); cf. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 1 (procedural rules should be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every actionn); In re Repetitive Stress Injury Cases, 
142 F.R.D. 584, 585-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing considerations supporting con- 
solidation of multiple actions into a single forum). But see Richard Epstein, The 
Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 
J.L. & COM. 1, 5-31 (1990) (conducting in depth inquiry into the Proposal and 
concluding that it may not further its announced goals of efficiency and fairness); 
Christine G. Clark, Comment, The Sky is Falling-The ALI's Efficient Response to 
Courts in Crisis?, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1019 (arguing that despite its announced 
objective of promoting efficiency, the procedures advocated by the Proposal may 
actually be less efficient than other existing procedures). 
50. Some commentators have suggested that the objectives of efficiency and 
litigant fairness may be antithetical. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 9, at  275-85 ("A 
tension between efficiency and fairness clearly exists . . . ."); Roger H. Transgrud, 
Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 69, 74 (criti- 
cizing the impact of aggregation of claims on individual litigants and suggesting 
that victims of mass disasters deserve the same access to judicial resources as a 
victim of an automobile accident, that is, individualized treatment). 
51. See In re Repetitive Stress, 142 F.R.D. at  586-88. Thus, for example, con- 
solidating cases can decrease costs by allowing for unified discovery of common 
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workload, thereby decreasing systemic delays and enabling the 
judicial system to render more justice for more people.5z As 
Professor Chafee wisely noted: "In matters of justice . . . the 
benefactor is he who makes one lawsuit grow where two grew 
before."53 Thus, collecting widely dispersed cases for unified 
treatment of common issues would produce transactional and 
economic efficiencies benefiting the judicial system, individual 
litigants, and society as a whole. 
Second, the practice of consolidating cases involving identi- 
cal issues, when combined with the efficiencies consolidation 
generates,54 increases the probability of the fair adjudication 
of individual litigants' claims. Because the impact of delays in 
litigation does not fall equally on all  litigant^,^^ reducing the 
aggregate judicial overload with its concomitant delays allevi- 
ates such inequities. Further, consolidating cases may make 
the courts more accessible to those with either small claims or 
few r e s o u r ~ e s . ~ ~  Moreover, the unified disposition of similar is- 
sues decreases the potential for disparate treatment of those 
similarly situated.57 Thus, consolidation avoids (i) inconsistent 
judgments for identical defendant conduct,58 (ii) the denial of 
relief caused by defendant insolvency, 59and (iii) the disruptive 
proactive filing of bankruptcy petitions as defendants face the 
threat of excessive and unpredictable damage awards." 
issues and by producing a common "pooling of knowledge" that allows litigants to 
"be better informed and able to reach more equitable dispositions of cases more 
quickly and at  less cost." Id. a t  587. Moreover, there is the "sheer economy of not 
having to litigate the same matters twice." Rowe & Sibley, supra note 21, a t  15. 
52. In re Repetitive Stress, 142 F.R.D. a t  585 ("[Tlhe interests of justice re- 
quire that . . . a wasteful duplication of effort and expense of the litigants and the 
resources of the judicial system should be avoided by a transfer and a consolida- 
tion of one action with the other") (quoting National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. R.H. 
Weber Exploration, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
53. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1297, 1297 (1932). 
54. Despite the inherent tension some find between efficiency and litigant 
fairness, the two values seem to have a close, interrelated character. As this sec- 
tion suggests, advancing a policy of transactional and economic efficiency functions 
to serve fairness interests as well. Similarly, the problems generated by transac- 
tional and economic inefficiency in modern complex litigation operate to produce 
problems of litigant unfairness. See supra part 1I.A. 
55. Supra note 23; see also Franklin et  al., supra note 18, a t  30. 
56. See In re Repetitive Stress, 142 F.R.D. at  585-86; cf. FED. R. CN. P. 23 
(class actions). 
57. Rowe & Sibley, supra note 21, a t  15. 
58. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  15 n.8; Rowe & 
Sibley, supra note 21, a t  15. 
59. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 21, a t  15. 
60. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  16; see also id. at  15 
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In sum, consolidating complex cases serves to advance 
efficiency-based interests as well as to promote increased fair- 
ness for litigants. Such considerations of efficiency and litigant 
fairness not only support adopting consolidation techniques but 
also are important policies a court must consider when issuing 
an antisuit injun~tion.~' 
111. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT AND THE ANTISUIT INJUNC- 
TION ~OVISION:  AN INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP 
As previously noted, consolidating complex cases advances 
substantial policies implicating the efficiency and fairness of 
the entire litigation process. Despite its arguable benefits, some 
litigants may choose to forego consolidation, producing 
duplicative litigation?' When duplicative litigation interferes 
with the disposition of consolidated proceedings or impairs 
attainment of maximal efficiency and fairness, the transferee 
court should and does possess the authority to enjoin the 
duplicative actions.63 Although federal transferee courts al- 
ready possess the authority to enjoin state court proceed- 
i n g ~ , ~ ~  the Anti-Injunction Act imposes strict limits on the ex- 
ercise of that power.65. The remainder of this Comment focus- 
ses on this tension between the power to issue injunctions and 
limits on that power and seeks to harmonize possible tensions 
between the commands of the Proposal's antisuit injunction 
provision and the restraints of the Anti-Injunction This 
n.7 (collecting cases in which defendant entered bankruptcy because of potential 
damages claims); supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
61. See infia parts IILB., IV. 
62. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04 cmt. a. 
63. "[Ilf consolidation is to achieve the degree of efficiency and fairness sought 
. . . it is necessary to provide for situations in which parties refuse to cooperate 
and the result is duplicative litigation that interferes with the transferee court's 
ability to manage . . . the claims before it." Id. cmt. a at  263; see also id., 5 5.04. 
64. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1657 (1988). Such power is grounded in the All Writs 
Act, which provides federal courts with the power to "issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions." Id. $ 1651. 
65. Id. 5 2283. The focus of this Comment, and particularly these next two 
sections, is on harmonizing the policies both urging and restraining federal court 
interference with state court proceedings. Thus, only restraints on injunctions 
against state court proceedings are examined. For an example of the (lesser) re- 
straints on federal court injunctions of other federal court proceedings, see Kerotest 
Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 US. 180 (1952). See also 1A JAMES W.
MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 'J[ 0.203[4] (1995) (discussing doctrine 
and collecting cases); see generally, Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and 
Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507 (1987). 
66. For a discussion of the possible tension between the antisuit provision 
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section first presents a discussion of the Anti-Injunction Act, 
including the public policies underlying and supporting adher- 
ence to its limitations. The discussion then turns to an exami- 
nation of the Proposal's antisuit injunction provisions. 
A. The Anti-Injunction Act 
Shortly after creating and defining the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts,67 Congress enacted legislation prohibiting them 
from enjoining ongoing state court pro~eedings.~~ Although the 
precise reasons for this prohibition are unknown,6' the Su- 
and the Anti-Injunction Act, see Brunet, supra note 9, a t  288 ("The . . . Complex 
Litigation Project creates a mechanism to issue injunctive orders; the Anti-Injunc- 
tion Act generally prohibits injunctive orders."). But cf: Sherman, supra note 65, a t  
528-29 (suggesting that the Anti-Injunction Act "has often been viewed as overrid- 
ing efficiency and fairness considerations that might otherwise justify an injunction 
against state litigation"). 
67. See U.S. CONST. art. 111, $8 1-2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 
(1789). 
68. "And be it further enacted, that . . . a writ of injunction [shall not] be 
granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state . . . ." Judiciary Act of 1793, 
ch. 22 § 5, 1 State. 334, 334-35 (1793). See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231- 
32 (1972); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 
281, 285 n.3 (1970); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129 (1941); 
MOORE, supra note 65, ¶ 0.208[1]; CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE $ 4221 (1988). 
69. "The history of this provision in the Judiciary Act of 1793 is not fully 
known." Toucey, 314 U.S. at  130; see also Mitchum, 407 U.S. at  232 (noting that 
the reasons for enacting the prohibition are "shrouded in obscurity"); Atlantic 
Coast, 298 U.S. at  285 (stating that "the reasons that led Congress to adopt this 
restriction on federal courts are not wholly clear"). After conducting an exhaustive 
review of the history surrounding its enactment, Justice Frankfurter suggested the 
following reasons for congressional enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1793: (i) a re- 
port made in 1790 by Attorney General Edmund Randolph suggesting possible 
changes to the Judiciary Act; andlor (ii) prevailing prejudices against current equity 
practices. A third possible reason-which Justice Frankfurter viewed as less influ- 
ential in bringing about the modification of the Act-was the Supreme Court's 
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which was handed 
down only two weeks before the Act was passed. In Chisholm, the Court held that 
states are subject to suit in federal court by non-state citizens. Toucey, 314 U.S., 
a t  130-32. Others examining the same historical record have concluded that Con- 
gress did not intend to bar all stays of state court proceedings. See Howard G. 
Ervin 111, Comment, Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings: A Re-examina- 
tion of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 612, 613 (1971) (suggest- 
ing that "Congress in 1793 did not intend to prevent stays . . . [rather] Congress 
specifically approved the use of the [common-law] writ of certiorari to stay state 
proceedings"). Yet others have said that Congress merely intended to prevent a 
Supreme Court Justice from enjoining state court proceedings while operating as a 
circuit justice. William T. Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction 
Statute, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 332-33 (1978). See generally, MOORE ET. AL., supra 
note 65, 1 0.208[1] (providing general history of the Anti-Injunction Act); WRIGHT 
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preme Court has traditionally taken the view that the Act's 
purpose is to prevent "needless friction between state and fed- 
eral courts."70 Although the initial prohibition was couched in 
absolute terms,71 Congress added, and the Supreme Court in- 
creasingly interpolated, exceptions into the text.72 The process 
of judicial interpolation of exceptions and most of its fruits 
were abruptly abandoned by the Court in Toucey v. New York 
Life Insurance ~ o r n ~ a n ~ . ~ ~  Rejecting the Toucey Court's rea- 
soning and results, however, the drafters of the 1948 revision 
ET. AL., supra note 68, 5 4221, at  494-95 (discussing and collecting articles on the 
history of the Anti-Injunction Statute); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1320-21 (3d ed. 1988) 
[hereinafker HART & WECHSLER'S] (discussing the history and purpose of the Anti- 
Injunction Statute and collecting cases and commentary). 
70. Okla. Packing Co. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939); 
Mitchum, 407 U.S. a t  233; see also Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp, 433 U.S. 623, 
630 (1977); Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. a t  286; Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 220, 225 (1954). 
71. See supra note 69; see also Mitchum, 407 U.S. at  233; Toucey, 314 U.S. 
a t  132. 
72. Thus, over time, the Court had found that Congress had expressly or 
impliedly created an exception to the general prohibition against injunctions re- 
straining state court proceedings in the following situations: (i) bankruptcy pro- 
ceedings; (ii) removal of cases from state to federal courts; (iii) actions to limit the 
liability of shipowners brought under the provisions of the Act of 1851, 9 Stat. 635; 
(iv) federal interpleader proceedings; (v) federal proceedings brought under the 
Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act; (vi) federal habeas corpus proceedings; and (vii) 
federal actions under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Mitchum, 407 U.S. 
a t  234-35; see also HART & WECHSLER'S, supra note 69, a t  1321-22; MOORE ET. AL., 
supra note 65, ¶0.208[2]; WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, 5 4221, a t  497-99. 
Moreover, the Court judicially inserted the following common-law exceptions 
into the anti-injunction statute: (i) a "res" exception, permitting a federal court to 
issue an injunction against a state court proceeding in order to protect its prior 
jurisdiction over a res; (ii) an exception permitting federal courts to enjoin the 
enforcement of judgments fraudulently obtained in state court proceedings; and (iii) 
the "relitigation" exception, permitting an injunction to issue restraining state court 
adjudication of issues litigated in a prior federal action. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at  
233-36; Toucey, 314 U.S. a t  132-39; see also MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 
¶ 0.208[2]; WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, 5 4221, at  497-99; HART & WECHSLER'S, 
supra note 69, at  1321-22. 
For a discussion of the scope of exceptions under the current Anti-Injunction 
Act, see infia part III.A.l. 
73. 314 U.S. 118 (1941). After noting that the anti-injunction statute stood for 
the proposition of "'hands off' by the federal courts in the use of the injunction to 
stay litigation in a state court," id. at  132, a majority of the Court expressly re- 
jected the judicially implied "relitigation" exception and impliedly rejected other 
judicially confected exceptions except for the "res" exception, id.; see Mitchum, 407 
U.S. at  236 (noting that the Toucey Court's result and reasoning "cast[] consider- 
able doubt upon the approach to the anti-injunction statute reflected in . . . previ- 
ous decisions"); see also MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, ¶ 0.208[2]; WRIGHT ET. AL., 
supra note 68, 5 4221; HART & WECHSLER'S, supra note 69, a t  1322. 
ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS 
of the Judicial Code rewrote the statute and included three 
exceptions to the general prohibition against restraining state 
court  proceeding^.'^ Although comprehensive treatment of the 
statute and the issues its interpretation have raised is beyond 
the scope of this Com~nent ,~~ the remainder of this section 
provides a general discussion of the scope of the Act's restraint 
on federal equity powers and the public policies underlying the 
Act's limitations. 
1. The Anti-Injunction Act's statutory scope 
In its current form,76 the Anti-Injunction Act provides 
74. See 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1988). The Reviser's note accompanying the statute 
states that the broad purpose of the revision is to "restore[] the basic law as gen- 
erally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." H.R. REP. NO. 308, 
80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181-A182 (1947), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 5 2283 (Historical 
and Statutory Notes). Although a revision of the anti-injunction statute provided an 
excellent opportunity to bring clarity to this area of law, several commentators 
have suggested that the 1948 revision failed to do so. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, 
The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 760 (1977) 
("[Tlhe anti-injunction statute is rife with inadequacies and ambiguities."); Com- 
ment, Anti-suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U .  CHI. L. REV. 
471, 482 (1965) (suggesting, inter alia, that the revision created more problems 
than it resolved); Donald P. Barrett, Comment, Federal Injunctions Against Pro- 
ceedings in State Courts, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 545, 563 (1947) (writing before enact- 
ment, the author presciently noted that "[this] revision does not appear to have 
[the] virtue" of resolving more problems than i t  creates). For a general discussion 
of the 1948 revision of the anti-injunction statute, see generally MOORE ET. AL., su- 
pra note 65, I 0.208[3.-11, at  2310; WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, 5 4221; HART 
& WECHSLER'S, supra note 69, a t  1322-23. 
Although the drafters of the revised statute may have intended to permit a 
return to a more functional interpretation of the scope of and exceptions to the 
Anti-Injunction Act, the Supreme Court seems instead to have adhered to Toucey's 
strict "hands off" approach when interpreting the statute and its exceptions. Thus, 
the court has stated: 
[Tlhe present Act is an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court 
proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically 
defined exceptions. . . . This is not a statute conveying a broad general 
policy for appropriate ad hoc application. Legislative policy is here ex- 
pressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined 
exceptions . . . [which] should not be enlarged by loose statutory construc- 
tion. 
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 
(1970) (citations omitted) (first and second emphasis added). But cf: COMPLEX LITI- 
GATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, $ 5.04, a t  269 (noting that "[slince its codification 
in 1948, $ 2283 has contained three broad exceptions under which antisuit injunc- 
tions may be issued") (emphasis added). 
75. For detailed treatment of the statute and its exceptions, see MOORE ET. 
AL., supra note 65, 11 0.208-0.209; WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, $5 4221-4226. 
76. The current version of the statute provides: "A court of the United States 
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that federal courts77 may not issue an i n j u n ~ t i o n ~ ~  against 
state court7g proceedingsB0 unless the injunction falls within 
one of three  exception^.^^ An injunction must be (i) "expressly 
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as ex- 
pressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, 
or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. 5 2283. 
77. The statute refers to a "court of the United States," which has been de- 
fined to include the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and district courts. See id. 
5 451; see also WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, 5 4222, a t  502 (listing federal 
courts excluded from the statute's prohibition by virtue of not falling within the 
statutorily defined term, "court of the United States"). 
78. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether the statutory 
prohibition against injunctions extends to declaratory judgments. Several lower 
courts and commentators, however, have suggested that it should. See, e.g., WRIGHT 
ET. AL., supra note 68, 5 4222, at  502-05. 
79. Although whether a court is a state court is a relatively easy issue to 
resolve, the issue of whether a state court is a "'court' within the meaning of 
5 2283," is, as Moore notes, "a complex one." MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 
1 0.208[3.-11, a t  2311. The complexity results from the Supreme Court's decision 
in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908), that the issue of 
whether a court is a state court within the meaning of 5 2283 "depends not upon 
the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings." Id. a t  226. 
Thus, the approach mandated by the Court is a functional one, requiring consider- 
ation of the facts on a case-by-case basis. See MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 
¶ 0.208[3.-11, a t  2311 & n.7; WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, 5 4222, at  509-511 
& m.30 & 31. 
Note, also, that although the statute phrases its prohibition in terms of injunc- 
tions against courts, the Court has stated that a federal court may not escape the 
impact of this ban merely by issuing an injunction against parties to a state court 
proceeding. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 
398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). This is so because "the proceedings of a state court . . . 
are as much interfered with when one of the parties to the suit is enjoined . . . as 
they are when the court itself is enjoined." Charles Warren, Federal and State 
Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 372 (1930). 
80. The scope of the statutory term "proceedings" has been expansively con- 
strued, see, e.g., Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935) ("That term is compre- 
hensive. It includes all steps taken or which may be taken in the state court or by 
its officers from the institution to the close of the final process."), with its scope, 
thereby, reaching not only ongoing proceedings, id., but also results of state court 
proceedings. See, e.g., County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54, 59 (1980). The 
statute, however, has no application before the proceedings actually begin. See, e.g., 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 226 (1972) (noting that 5 2283 bars injunctions 
against "pending" state proceedings); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
See generally MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 9[ 0.208[3.-11, a t  2314-2315 & 
0.208[3.-31 (discussing the scope of the statutory term "proceedings"); WRIGHT ET. 
AL., supra note 68, 4 4222, at  505-509. 
81. Although the Court has interpreted the statute to be an absolute ban on 
injunctions unless falling within an exception, Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. a t  286, the 
Court has, nevertheless, judicially confected two additional exceptions to the Act. 
The first exception applies when the United States or, in some situations, a federal 
agency requests an injunction. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 
220, 224-26 (1957) (excepting United States from the coverage of 5 2283 when 
acting as plaintiff); NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 146 (1971) (extending 
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authorized by Act of Congress"; (ii) "necessary in aid of [the 
issuing court's] jurisdiction"; or (iii) "[necessary] to protect or 
effectuate [the court's]  judgment^."^^ Each of these exceptions 
will be reviewed in turn. 
First, a federal court may enjoin state court proceedings 
when the court finds express congressional authorization for an 
in jun~t ion.~~ Despite the statute's requirement of an "express" 
authorization, the Court has not interpreted the statute to 
require that congressional authorization either mention the 
Anti-Injunction Act itself or state that a federal court is autho- 
rized to enjoin state court proceedings." Rather, the Court 
has enunciated the following test for determining whether 
Congress has "expressly authorized" an injunction to issue: 
Congress has authorized an injunction when "an Act of Con- 
gress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in 
a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only 
by the stay of a state court pro~eeding."~~ The relative clarity 
of this approach has been substantially undercut by more re- 
cent court decisions suggesting a narrower scope to this excep- 
tion? 
the Leiter rationale to an instrument of the federal government); see generally 
MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 'jI 0.208[3.002] (discussing the inapplicability of the 
Act as a bar to injunctions sought by the United States). A second exception seems 
to be the principle evinced in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908), that a 
defendant in a state prosecution may obtain an injunction against state proceedings 
when federal constitutional rights are implicated by the state prosecution, See 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) ("[A] judicial exception . . . has been 
made where a person about to be prosecuted in a state court can show that he 
will, if the proceeding in the state court is not enjoined, suffer irreparable damag- 
es."). 
82. 28 U.S.C. 5 2283. 
83. Id.; see Mitchum, 407 U.S. a t  237-38; see also MOORE ET. AL., supra note 
65, 'jI 0.209[11 (discussing the "expressly authorized" exception); WRIGHT ET. AL., 
supra note 68, 5 4224 (same). The implicit rationale for this exception seems to be 
that as Congress has imposed the ban, it may, in its discretion, determine when 
the prohibition should be lifted in order to effectuate its own legislative policies; cf. 
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at  233-34. 
84. "In the first place, it is evident that . . . a federal law need not contain 
an express reference to that statute. . . . Secondly, a federal law need not express- 
ly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to qualify as  an 
exception." Mitchum, 407 U.S. a t  237; see also Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. 
Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 521-23 (1955) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
85. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at  238. Applying these principles, the Court has found 
that Congress has "expressly authorized" exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act in 
the following areas: (i) bankruptcy proceedings; (ii) interpleader; (iii) removal; (iv) 
civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1988); (v) federal habeas corpus; and 
(vi) actions brought under the statute limiting the liability of shipowners. See id. 
a t  233-43; MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 'jI'jI 0.209[1.-11 to 0.209[1.--51. 
86. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977). In Vendo the 
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Second, a court may enjoin state proceedings when neces- 
sary to effectually adjudicate proceedings currently before it.87 
The Court has interpreted this exception in a narrow, stringent 
fashionss in spite of the more expansive view arguably found 
within the exception's own terms,89 leading one commentator 
to conclude that this is "the most enigmatic of the three excep- 
tions to the Anti-Injunction Stat~te."~'  Thus, the Atlantic 
Coast Court held that an injunction could not issue unless "fed- 
eral injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court 
from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or dispo- 
sition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexi- 
bility and authority to decide that case."g1 The interpretive 
rule afforded by Atlantic Coast has fostered a narrow applica- 
tion of this exception by the Supreme Court as well as by the 
lower federal courts.92 Consequently, although courts have 
uniformly held that this section permits courts in possession of 
a res to enjoin state court proceedings potentially interfering 
with the court's disposition of the  re^,'^ and while many 
Supreme Court substantially muddled its Mitchum rule for interpreting the "ex- 
pressly authorized" exception, producing conflicting results among lower courts 
attempting to apply the newly minted Mitchum-Vendo test. See generally MOORE 
ET. AL., supra note 65, f 0.209[1.-51, at  2332-34 (discussing the development of 
this exception after Mitchum); HART & WECHSLER'S supra note 69, at  1324-26. 
87. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283; see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco- 
motive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970); see also MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 
q[ 0.209[2]; WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, $ 4425; see generally HART & 
WECHSLER'S, supra note 69, a t  1326-27. 
88. "[A] federal court does not have inherent power to ignore the limitations 
of $ 2283 and to enjoin state court proceedings merely because those proceedings 
interfere with a protected federal right or invade an area preempted by federal 
law, even when the interference is unmistakably clear." Atlantic Coast, 298 U.S. at 
2994. This interpretation is consistent with the Court's statements about the prop- 
er interpretation of the statute. See supra note 74. 
89. See Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. a t  295 (noting that the "language is admit- 
tedly broad"); WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, $ 4225, at 530-33 (suggesting that 
the language of the exception and Supreme Court interpretations would permit a 
broader scope to this exception; and noting commentators concurring in this view). 
90. bhWl"l'N H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION 
OF JUDICIAL POWER 278 (1980). 
91. Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. at  295. 
92. MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, f 0.209[2], at 2339 & n.20 (collecting fed- 
eral court cases adhering to the narrower scope of the exception suggested by the 
Court in Atlantic Coast). 
93. See MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, '8 0.209[2]; WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 
68, $ 4225, at 528-30 & n.5 (noting that courts have uniformly found the res ex- 
ception to fall within the scope of this exception and collecting cases so holding). 
Federal courts have rebuffed, however, "novel attempts . . . to characterize . . . 
actions as in rem . . . [so as to] come within the umbrella of this exception." 
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courts have included federal court oversight of school desegre- 
gation cases within the scope of this exception? it is unclear 
what other situations-if, indeed, any-might fall within the 
terms of this ex~eption.'~ 
Third, after a federal court has rendered j~dgrnent?~ it
may "protect or effectuate its judgment" by enjoining subse- 
quent state court relitigation of issues or claims already fully 
litigated during the federal pr~ceeding.~? In effect, this excep- 
tion removes the need for federal litigants to raise a claim of 
res judicata in subsequent state pro~eedings.~~ Recently the 
MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 1 0.209[2], a t  2339 & 11.22 (collecting cases demon- 
strating such "novel attempts"); see also WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, § 4225, at  
528-33 (analyzing scope of this exception and suggesting a broader interpretation 
that would include class actions within the res exception). For an example of such 
an attempt and the court's rebuff, see In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 
1175, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1982) (rejecting argument that a class action is an excep- 
tion to 5 2283). But see In  re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 336-38 (2d Cir. 
1985) (concluding that injunction was properly granted under this exception when 
the class action proceedings were so far advanced that the need for court control 
over the action was similar to the need to have complete control over a res). 
94. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186-87 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that an injunction of a state court proceeding interfering with federal 
court supervision of school desegregation would fall within this exception); Swam 
v. Charlotte-Meckleburg Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1974). 
95. Ironically, the class of cases intended by the revisers to fall within this 
exception-ases removed from state to federal court-has been fit into the "ex- 
pressly authorized" exception instead. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (Historical and Revision 
Noted) ("[This section] make[sl clear the recognized power of the Federal courts to 
stay proceedings in State cases removed to the district courts."); Vendo Co. v. 
Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 640 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting federal 
court power to enjoin state court proceedings following removal of the case to the 
federal court). 
96. Because issuance of an injunction prior to the conclusion of the federal 
proceedings would eviscerate the long-standing policy permitting federal and state 
claims in personal actions to be adjudicated simultaneously, see Kline v. Burke 
Constr. Co., 260 US. 226, 230 (1922), a federal court may not issue an injunction 
until a finalized judgment exists, United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d 
802, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
97. 28 U.S.C. 2283; see, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 288-94 (1970). The relitigation exception expressly 
overrules the central holding of Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 US.  118 
(1941), which concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the issuance of an 
injunction to restrain the relitigation of matters previously adjudicated in federal 
court. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (Historical and Revision Notes) ("The exception[] specifically 
include[s] the words 'to protect' or 'effectuate its judgments,' for lack of which the 
Supreme Court held that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin 
relitigation . . . . "). For a discussion of the relitigation exception, see generally 
MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 1 0.209[3]; WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, 8 4226; 
HART & WECHSLER'S, supra note 69, a t  1327-28. 
98. Arguably, a party would find the cost, effort, and expense of litigating his 
rights in federal court to be worthless if the court could not enforce its judgment 
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Supreme Court has clarified the timing and scope of injunc- 
tions issued under the relitigation ex~ep t ion .~~  First, an anti- 
relitigation injunction may not issue after a claim of res judi- 
cata has been raised in and adjudicated by the state court.loO 
Thus, the relitigation exception applies only when a party ob- 
tains an anti-relitigation injunction before either a claim of res 
judicata is raised in or decided by the state court.lO' Second, 
an injunction issued under the relitigation exception may only 
prevent relitigation of issues and claims actually decided by the 
federal court.lo2 Thus, framing the scope of an injunction un- 
der this exception requires a careful examination of the federal 
court record to ascertain "what the earlier federal order actual- 
ly said" rather than "what the order was intended to say."lo3 
against subsequent efforts by the losing party to obtain state court nullification of 
the federal decree-especially in light of limited Supreme Court appellate review of 
state court decisions. Because the issuance of an injunction is within the discretion 
of the federal court, a party may, however, be required to plead res judicata in a 
state court proceeding when doing so would not be unduly burdensome. See Lamb 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d 1052, 1058 (6th Cir. 1977); cfi Chick Kam 
Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 157 (1988); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 
243 (1972) (noting that "principles of equity, comity, and federalism . . . must 
restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding," and sug- 
gesting that injunctions should not issue automatically merely because an exception 
exists); see infia note 135 and accompanying text (noting that an injunction need 
not issue merely because it may issue). 
99. See Chick Karn Choo, 486 U.S. at  148-51 (discussing the permissible scope 
of an injunction); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 524 (1986) 
(discussing the timing of an injunction petition); see also MOORE ET. AL., supra 
note 65, ¶ 0.209[3] (analyzing the relitigation exception); see generally HART & 
WECHSLER'S, supra note 69, a t  1327-28 (analyzing the relitigation exception). 
100. Parsons Steel, 474 U.S. at  524; see MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 
¶ 0.209[3]. This express limitation on the relitigation exception is a concomitant of 
the demands of the Full Faith and Credit Act: once a state court has rendered a 
decision on the res judicata issue, that determination is itself binding on parties 
before the federal court. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1738 (1988) (Full Faith & Credit Act). 
101. The timing rule laid down in Parsons Steel has led some to suggest that 
it creates incentives to forego a claim of preclusion in the state court in favor of 
immediately seeking an injunction in federal court, MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 
'jl 0.209[3], at  2346 (quoting Professors Chemerinsky and Redish), and others to 
query whether this principle is likely to create more, rather than less, friction 
between state and federal courts, HART & WECHSLER'S, supra note 69, a t  1328. 
102. "IA]n essential prerequisite for applying the relitigation exception is that 
the claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litigation in state 
proceedings actually have been decided by the federal court." Chick Kam Choo, 486 
U.S. at  148. 
103. Id. a t  148. For an example of such an analysis, see Atlantic Coast Line 
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 288, 288-93 (1970). 
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2. Policies served by the Anti-Injunction Act 
Although the primary reasons motivating Congress to 
enact the Anti-Injunction Act may be largely unknown and 
unknowable, several important policies are arguably served by 
the practice of not enjoining state court proceedings except in 
certain, narrowly defined situations.lo4 Although phrased in a 
variety of ways, these policies fall within two general princi- 
ples: (i) judicial comity; and (ii) judicial federalism.lo5 
First, judicial comity is served by restraining federal courts 
from freely enjoining state court proceedings. As applied to a 
federal system of administering justice, judicial comity suggests 
that the courts of one sovereign "should be extremely reluctant 
to interfere in the administration of justice" by the courts of the 
other sovereign.lo6 Adherence to this principle of non-interfer- 
ence by one court system with the operations of another avoids 
unnecessary, or at least reduces the magnitude of, conflict 
between two judicial systems. lo' Moreover, restraining the 
issuance of injunctions goes far to promote a more harmonious 
working relationship between courts fkequently possessing 
jurisdiction over the same subject matters.lo8 As Justice 
104. See Parsons Steel, 474 U.S. a t  518; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 228- 
36 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971); Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. a t  
285-87; Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132 (1941); Paul M. 
Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 605 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543 (1985); Redish, supra note 74, a t  760; David Mason, Note, Slogan or Sub- 
stance? Understanding "Our Federalism" and Younger Abstention, 73 CORNELL . 
REV. 852 (1982). 
105. Although the principles of comity and federalism are treated here as ana- 
lytically distinct concepts, they may in fact represent overlapping principles, see 
Shapiro, supra note 104, at 583, or, as Justice Black suggests, variations on a 
theme of "Our Federalism," see Younger, 401 U.S. a t  44-45; Atlantic Coast, 398 
U.S. at  285-87. 
106. Allan D. Vestal, Protecting a Federal Court Judgment, 42 TENN. L. REV. 
635, 669 (1975); see Mitchum, 407 U.S. at  230 (noting the "national policy forbid- 
ding federal courts to stay . . . state court proceedings except under special circum- 
stances" (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. a t  41, 44)); Toucey, 314 U.S. at  132 (stating 
that the Act "expresses on its face the duty of 'hands off' by the federal courtsn); 
Mason, supra note 104, at  866-67 (concluding that "chief tenet" of Younger is that 
federal courts should not interfere with state courts unless necessary). 
107. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at  232-33 (quoting Okla. Packing Co. v. Okla. Gas 
& Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939)); cf: Bator, supra note 104, at  620 (noting that 
"especially sensitive political nerves are likely to be touched if federal judges are 
free to enjoin . . . state court enforcement proceedings on the basis of claims which 
could be adjudicated in those proceedings"). 
108. "A sound conception of our federal system requires a federal court to 
withhold intervention with state procedure in the interest of maintaining harmony 
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Frankfurter sagely concluded, "[The anti-injunction statute] is 
an historical mechanism . . . for achieving harmony in one 
phase of our complicated federalism by avoiding needless fric- 
tion between two systems of courts having potential jurisdiction 
over the same subject-matter."10g 
In addition to promoting judicial comity, the prohibition 
against enjoining state court proceedings advances principles of 
judicial federalism. Judicial federalism builds upon comity's 
tenet of non-interference, and establishes as its own "funda- 
mental precept . . . [the belief] that the state and federal courts 
should be independent of one another."'" Under the system 
of government established by the United States Constitution, 
both the national and state governments retained the right and 
authority to have their own judicial bodies operate essentially 
independently of the other when adjudicating legal controver- 
sies despite their frequently overlapping subject matter 
jurisdiction."' The Anti-Injunction Act is a necessary and 
natural result of and means for effectuating this constitutional- 
ly mandated federal-state judicial aut~nomy."~ The Act pre- 
serves this constitutional independence of state judicial sys- 
tems and permits the dual system to work effectively by estab- 
lishing a line of demarcation that prevents potentially destruc- 
tive federal court intervention into state court operations ex- 
cept in narrowly defined instances.l13 
within the system." Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 358 F. Supp. 
327, 329 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (citation omitted). 
109. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 378 (1939). 
110. Redish, supra note 74, at  717; see also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Broth- 
erhood of Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970) (noting the "fundamental constitutional 
independence of the States and their courts"). 
111. See Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. a t  285-86. 
112. See id. at  286-87; see also Texas Employers' Ins. h s ' n  v. Jackson, 862 
F.2d 491, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting the Act to be a necessary concomitant of 
the dual system of federal and state courts) (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon 
Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988)); Brooks v. Barbour Energy Corp, 804 F.2d 1144, 1146 
(10th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that the Act promotes the independence of state 
courts); cf. Mason, supra note 104, a t  867 (suggesting that the policy guiding the 
relationship between state and federal courts rests on the federal system estab- 
lished by the Constitution). 
113. See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) (stating 
that "[plrevention of frequent federal court intervention is important to make the 
dual system work effectively"); Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. at  286 (noting that in or- 
der to make the dual system of courts function, it was necessary to "work out 
lines of demarcation between the two systemsn and that the Act spells out some of 
these lines). 
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In sum, the Anti-Injunction Act's restraint on enjoining 
state court proceedings serves both to protect the independent 
authority of state courts and to promote a properly limited 
interference with the operation of state court ~ystems."~ 
These benefits not only counsel strict adherence to the terms of 
the Act, but also serve as countervailing factors a court must 
consider when reviewing a petition for an injunction falling 
within the scope of an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.ll5 
B. The Complex Litigation Proposal's Antisuit Injunction 
Provision 
Although the procedures for and benefits of consolidation 
should prove sufficient to bring together all appropriate cas- 
e ~ , " ~  some may escape consolidation through either happen- 
stance or intentional efforts to avoid con~olidat ion.~~~ Because 
114. Perhaps the best summation and effective explanation of the need for the 
principles advanced by a policy of federal court restraint was made by Justice 
Hugo Black in Younger v. Harris: 
[The] underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering 
. . . [is] the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state func- 
tions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a 
Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that 
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institu- 
tions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate 
ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is 
referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the pro- 
found debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is 
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of 
"Our Federalism." The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' 
Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over every im- 
portant issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers 
rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system 
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and 
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious 
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal inter- 
est, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere 
with the legitimate activities of the States. I t  should never be forgotten 
that this slogan, "Ow Federalism," born in the early struggling days of 
our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's 
history and its future. 
Younger, 401 U.S. a t  44-45 (emphasis added). 
115. See infia part IV. 
116. See supra part 1I.B. 
117. Accidental non-consolidation of transactionally related claims might result 
for one of two reasons: (i) the claims are filed after the Complex Litigation Panel 
has already consolidated and transferred claims; or (ii) the claims are filed before 
consolidation but the Complex Litigation Panel is unaware of the related claims. 
Purposeful nonconsolidation could result from any number of litigant motives, in- 
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failure to consolidate such cases may lead to duplicative liti- 
gation, wasted judicial resources, and litigant unfair- 
ness118-problems sought to be alleviated by consolida- 
tionllg-the Proposal provides transferee courts with author- 
ity to enjoin transactionally related duplicative proceedings 
threatening to interfere with the efficient and equitable dispo- 
sition of consolidated actions.120 
Because the inherent power of federal transferee courts to 
issue antisuit injunctions would otherwise be constrained by 
the provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Proposal proposes 
to have the antisuit provision operate within the "expressly 
authorized" exception.121 
Section 5.04, the Antisuit Injunction provision of the Com- 
plex Litigation Proposal, provides122 that a federal transferee 
court may enjoin transactionally related pro~eedings'~~ in 
cluding a desire to beat the transferee court to judgment by refiling a claim in 
state court after claim consolidation. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra 
note 2, 5 5.04 cmt. a, at  263-64, 266 n.1. 
118. See supra part 1I.A. 
119. See supra part 1I.B. 
120. For a discussion of the types of interference that might result from 
duplicative litigation of transactionally related claims, see COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04 cmt. a, a t  264-65. 
121. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. Because the standard for 
finding implied congressional authorization under the Mitchum-Vendo test is sub- 
stantially unclear, see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text, the Proposal has 
provided for explicit statutory authority in its model Complex Litigation Statute. 
See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, app. A at  443; see also id. 
5 5.04 reporter's notes to cmt. b at  268 n.6 (suggesting need for explicit authoriza- 
tion in light of court refusals to permit injunctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)). 
122. Section 5.04 provides: 
(a) When actions are transferred and consolidated pursuant to $ 3.01 or 
5 5.01, the transferee court may enjoin transactionally related proceedings, 
or portions thereof, pending in any state or federal court whenever it 
determines that the continuation of those actions substantially impairs or 
interferes with the consolidated actions and that an injunction would 
promote the just, efficient, and fair resolution of the actions before it. 
(b) Factors to be considered in deciding whether an injunction should 
issue under subsection (a) include 
(1) how far the actions to be enjoined have progressed; 
(2) the degree to which the actions to be enjoined share common 
questions with and are duplicative of the consolidated actions; 
(3) the extent to which the actions to be enjoined involve issues or 
claims of federal law; and 
(4) whether parties to the action to be enjoined were permitted to 
exclude themselves from the consolidated proceeding under 5 3.05(a) 
or 5 5.01(b). 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04. 
123. Because an antisuit injunction against proceedings that are merely 
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state or federal courts when it concludes that (i) the litigation 
would impair its disposition of the consolidated actions and (ii) 
an injunction would further the efficiency and litigant fairness 
policies underlying consolidation.124 When determining 
whether these two factors are satisfied, the Antisuit Injunction 
provision provides the transferee court with a non-exhaustive 
list of factors to be considered.lZ5 These factors include such 
considerations as (i) what stage of litigation the actions to be 
enjoined have reached; (ii) the substantive nature and degree of 
commonality shared by the various claims; and (iii) whether 
the parties to be enjoined were previously excused from consol- 
idation.lZ6 After considering these factors and reaching the 
firm conclusion that an injunction will "foster the overall objec- 
tives of [claim consolidation]," the transferee court may issue 
an injun~ti0n. l~~ 
Although section 5.04 fails to provide any factors requiring 
the transferee court to consider the impact an injunction would 
have on the principles of federalism and comity,128 the 
Reporter's notes suggest that such considerations are appropri- 
ate and should enter into the court's calculus when determin- 
ing whether an injunction should issue.12' The following sec- 
transactionally related to the consolidated action may run against non-parties, 
5 5.04 effectively expands the current jurisdictional authority of federal courts 
when issuing such injunctions. 
124. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04(a). 
125. See id 5 5.04(b). Rather than attempt to list all relevant factors, the Pro- 
posal settled for a list containing-in its opinion-the most relevant factors for 
determining whether an injunction would be appropriate. However, the Proposal 
states that the determination of whether an injunction would be appropriate "de- 
pend[~] on a review of the circumstances of each case . . . requir[ing] the careful 
balancing . . . of the need for injunctive relief against the need to avoid being 
unduly intrusive." Id. 5 5.04 reporter's notes to cmt. c a t  271. For a discussion of 
additional factors a court should consider, see infra part IV. 
126. See supra note 122. For a discussion of how these factors should govern a 
court's disposition, see COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04 
reporter's notes to cmts. c & d a t  270-75; see also infia part IV. 
127. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04, reporter's notes to 
cmt. c a t  271. Consideration of these factors is also relevant in determining the 
scope of any injunction to be issued against transactionally related proceedings. See 
id. at  265, 270-72. 
128. This omission limns Professor Brunet's conclusion that, whereas the Anti- 
Injunction Act restrains injunctions because of federalism and comity concerns, the 
Antisuit Injunction provision of the Complex Litigation Proposal creates a tool for 
issuing injunctions because of efficiency concerns. See Brunet, supra note 9, at  285- 
90. 
129. Thus, the Reporter suggests that, although not expressly included within 
the statute, "federalism notions . . . [neither] should be [nlor are ignored . . . . 
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tion discusses how such an inquiry incorporating principles of 
federalism and comity might be framed and executed. 
IV. HARMONIZING EFFICIENCY AND FEDERALISM: A PROPOSED 
DECISIONAL SCHEMA FOR ISSUING ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS 
Considerations of public policy support both consolidating 
complex cases and enjoining transactionally related proceedings 
threatening to impair both disposition of the consolidated ac- 
tions and attainment of efficiency and litigant fairness objec- 
tives. Equally substantial considerations of judicial comity and 
federalism, however, counsel adherence to traditional restraints 
against enjoining state court proceedings. Thus, while the 
Proposal's policies of efficiency and fairness may counsel in 
favor of issuing an injunction, the principles of judicial comity 
and federalism may urge restraint. Consequently, a federal 
transferee court must stand ready to reconcile the conflicting 
policy directives underlying both the Complex Litigation Pro- 
posal and the Anti-Injunction Act in order to advance the one 
while preserving the other.'" Although the Antisuit Injunc- 
tion provision operates within an exception to the Anti-Injunc- 
tion Act, theoretically permitting automatic issuance of an 
injunction restraining state court proceedings, traditional prin- 
ciples of federal court jurisdictional discretion permit a federal 
court to decline to issue an otherwise permissible injunction. 
Through applying this traditional discretion, a federal transfer- 
ee court may reconcile the Proposal's demands of efficiency and 
fairness with the requirements of federalism and comity. This 
section first discusses federal court discretion and then sug- 
gests how and when such an exercise of principled discretion 
should be made. 
Traditional principles of federal court jurisprudence sug- 
gest that federal courts may not decline to exercise that juris- 
Included in the calculus will be [such] concerns." COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, 
supra note 2, $ 5.04 reporter's notes to cmt. b at  270; see also id. at $ 5.04(a). But 
see Brunet, supra note 9, at  288-89 (suggesting that "managerial judgesn applying 
the Proposal's balancing interest test will value efficiency more heavily than other 
values such as state sovereignty and federalism). 
130. In terms of the metaphoric perspective adopted at  the outset of this pa- 
per, see supra note l and accompanying text, a federal transferee court must be 
able to harmonize the competing sounds produced by the sirens' song of efficiency 
and fairness and by the judicial hymn of federalism and comity. See supra part I. 
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diction conferred by the Con~titution.'~~ As Chief Justice 
John Marshall declared: 
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it 
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdic- 
tion if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, 
avoid a measure . . . . We have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that 
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to 
the con~titution.'~~ 
This principle, that federal courts may not decline to exercise 
the jurisdiction granted, rests squarely on the notion that, 
under the Constitution, the scope of federal jurisdiction to be 
exercised is textually committed to the discretion of Congress 
rather than to that of the ~udiciary. '~~ 
Nevertheless, both members of the Court and commenta- 
tors have suggested that equally orthodox principles of federal 
131. Justice Brennan has described this principle in near absolute terms as  
"the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction 
given them." Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
817 (1976); see also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 
U.S. 411, 415 (1964) (noting that federal courts must exercise that jurisdiction 
properly granted them); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1943) 
(noting that federal courts should exercise the jurisdiction congressionally granted 
"subject only to such limitations as traditionally justify courts in declining to exer- 
cise the jurisdiction which they possess"). 
132. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (dictum); cf. 
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910) (chiding the lower court, which had 
stayed its own proceedings in favor of yet-to-be-filed state proceedings, for "practi- 
cally abandon[ingl its jurisdiction over a case of which it had cognizance . . . 
[something] a Federal court may not do"). 
Although Cohens may have been the first Supreme Court expression of this 
near absolutist principle of jurisdiction, i t  has certainly not been the last. Thus, in 
Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893), the Court affirmed that "the 
courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment . . . in every case to 
which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in 
any case . . . ." Id. a t  534; see Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 
(1909) ("When a Federal court is properly appealed to . . . it is its duty to take 
such jurisdiction . . . .") (citations omitted). But see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 US. 
288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (suggesting that federal courts may have 
discretion to decline to adjudicate claims otherwise falling within their jurisdiction). 
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Ger- 
ald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtuesn-A Comment on Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
133. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 US. 
350, 359 (1989) (noting that the reason for this absolutist principle is the "principle 
that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction." (cit- 
ing Cline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)). 
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court jurisprudence permit a federal court to decline to exercise 
its jurisdiction, especially when the request is for an exercise of 
its equitable powers. Thus, Justice Scalia has stated that al- 
though federal courts do have a duty to act on claims falling 
within their jurisdiction, 
[tfhat principle does not eliminate however, and the categori- 
cal assertions based upon it do not call into question, the 
federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant 
certain types of relief-a discretion that was part of the com- 
mon-law background against which the statues conferring 
jurisdiction were enacted.ls4 
Because an injunction is an equitable remedy, a request for 
an injunction restraining state court proceedings falls precisely 
within this jurisdictional zone of discretion described by Justice 
Scalia. Thus, although an injunction may fall within an excep- 
tion to the Anti-Injunction Act, an injunction need not automat- 
ically issue.135 Rather, the court must make the decision to 
134. Id. at 359; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (noting that 
declining to issue an injunction is sometimes "the normal thing to don). 
Whether federal courts may legitimately exercise principled discretion over their 
jurisdiction has attracted widespread debate. See Bator, supra note 104 (pro) (sug- 
gesting that federal courts have discretion in exercising jurisdiction); Martin H. 
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 
94 YALE L.J. 71, 72 (1984) (contra) ("Invalidating legislation because a court thinks 
it is unwise or would make judges work too hard would amount to a blatant-and 
indefensible-usurpation of legislative authority. . . . Yet, in a sense, the abstention 
doctrines amount to such usurpation."); Shapiro, supra note 104, at  545 (pro) (argu- 
ing that "suggestions of an overriding obligation . . . are far too grudging in their 
recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction"); Michael Wells, Why 
Professor Redish Is Wrong about Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097, 1132 (1985) (pro) 
(arguing that "judge made rules restricting federal jurisdiction are not judicial 
usurpation of power, but are part of a common law of federal jurisdictionn). 
135. "Of course, the fact that an injunction may issue under the Anti-In- 
junction Act does not mean that it must issue." Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 
486 U.S. 140, 151, (1988); see Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 
F.2d 1263, 1274 (7th Cir. 1976) ("Although one of the exceptions . . . must exist 
before a federal court has power . . . the court has discretion to exercise that pow- 
er  once it exists. The power to enjoin state proceedings is discretionary . . . ."). 
The principle that federal courts possess and should use discretion when issu- 
ing an injunction otherwise falling within an exception to 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 has 
been widely noted. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Hartigan, 816 F.2d 1177, 
1181 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Ilf a statutory exception is triggered, the decision to issue 
an injunction lies within the discretion of the court . . . ."); Bechtel Petroleum v. 
Webseter, 796 F.2d 252, 253 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the decision to enjoin is 
"committed to the discretion of the district court"); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Lawing, 731 F.2d 680, 682-83 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that a court must consider 
the principles of equity, comity, and federalism when "determining whether to 
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issue an injunction in light of those traditional principles re- 
straining injunctions against state court proceedings: comity 
and federa1i~rn.l~~ Legitimate, orthodox principles of federal 
court discretion, then, permit a federal transferee court to de- 
cline to enjoin duplicative state court proceedings. Consequent- 
ly, although an antisuit injunction may technically be permissi- 
ble under section 5.04, a federal transferee court may use its 
discretion to deny the injunction, thereby advancing and pro- 
tecting federalism and comity policies. 
Nevertheless, the manifold problems created by complex, 
duplicative litigation coupled with the policies sought to be 
advanced by consolidation strongly counsel against lightly de- 
clining to enjoin duplicative proceedings. Merely to concede 
discretion is not to permit its unbridled exercise.137 Rather, a 
exercise [its] discretion by granting the injunction once one of the statutory excep- 
tions has been met"); WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 68, 5 4226, a t  551-55 (discussing 
this principle that "[tlhe mere existence of power (to enjoin) does not mean that 
this power is to be exercised as a matter of routine"); see also First Ala. Bank v. 
Parsons Steel, Inc., 825 F.2d 1475, 1483 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe fact an injunction 
may be permissible under an exception . . . does not mean that . . . an injunction 
is appropriate . . . ."); cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 
2, a t  lines 107-09 ("0, it is excellent to have a giant's strength, but i t  is tyrannous 
to use it like a giant.") But see Tampa Phosphate R.R. v. Seaboard Coast Line 
R.R., 418 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1969) ("As a general rule . . . [this principle] will 
not bar a federal injunction where there are circumstances which bring the case 
within one of the exceptions to 5 2283.") (citation omitted); see also WRIGHT ET. 
AL., supra note 68, 5 4226, at  552-53 (noting the frequent practice of "virtually 
automatic injunctions" in the relitigation exception area and collecting cases and 
commentary). 
136. "In concluding [that an injunction falls within an exception], we do not 
question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that 
must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 US. 225, 243 (1972); see Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. 
Bank, 474 US. 518, 526 (1986); see also First Alabama Bank, 825 F.2d a t  1482-86 
(analyzing whether a district court's issuance of injunction was appropriate in light 
of the "general principles of equity, comity, and federalism"); Kerr-McGee, 816 F.2d 
a t  1181-82 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster for the proposition that principles of equity, 
comity, and federalism must inform the court's decision whether to issue an injunc- 
tion); First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 731 F.2d at  683; MOORE ET. AL., supra note 65, 
¶ 0.208[3.-11, a t  2312-13 & n.9 (collecting cases). For an interesting suggestion of 
the role that these principles of comity and federalism have played in the past, see 
Mayton, supra note 69, a t  338-46 (concluding that considerations of comity and 
federalism, rather than the anti-injunction statute itself, governed federal court 
injunctions against state court proceedings during the first several decades of the 
nation). 
137. See Shapiro, supra note 104, a t  575 ("[Although] on appropriate occasions 
. . . [a court may] determine . . . [that] the ends of justice will be served best by 
declining to proceed . . . nothing in our history or traditions permits a court to 
interpret a normal grant of jurisdiction as conferring unbridled authority to hear 
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court must exercise principled discretion when deciding wheth- 
er to enjoin duplicative pro~eedings.'~~ The decision to  issue 
an injunction should be made against the backdrop of consider- 
ations of (i) the present need for enjoining transactionally relat- 
ed state court proceedings and (ii) of the effect an injunction 
would have not only on the parties being enjoined but also on 
the principles of comity and federalism traditionally counseling 
federal restraint. 13' 
First, then, the federal transferee court should determine 
whether the circumstances counsel in favor of or against en- 
joining duplicative state proceedings.140 In making this deter- 
mination, the court should examine two factors:14' 
1. Substantial Interference: '42 After reviewing all 
the circumstances, the court should determine whether 
continuation of the nonconsolidated actions would 
substantially impair or interfere with disposition of the 
consolidated actions. This prong of the test requires 
the court to consider: 
a. Case Pr~gress: '~~ Because the level of 
cases simply at  its pleasure."). 
138. Although some have suggested that the notion of principled discretion is 
oxymoronic, Professor Shapiro sharply disagrees: 
I do not believe that the concept of "principled discretion" is an oxymoron. 
In the present context, it means that criteria drawn from the relevant 
statutory or constitutional grant of jurisdiction or from the tradition with- 
in which the grant arose guide the choices to be made in the course of 
defining and exercising that jurisdiction. 
Id. at  578. The exercise of principled jurisdictional discretion proposed by this 
Comment is consistent with Professor Shapiro's definition. 
139. This exercise of principled discretion permits a federal transferee court to 
functionally satisfy 5 5.04's requirements that an injunction issue only if (i) the 
duplicative proceeding will substantially impair or interfere with disposition of the 
consolidated actions; and (ii) the injunction will further the fairness and efficiency 
objectives of the proposal. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04. 
Moreover, this decisional scheme also assists the court in gauging the impact of an 
injunction on party and state interests. See id., reporter's notes to cmt. c at  
270-273; see also supra part 1II.B. 
140. See COWLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 4 5.04. 
141. Consideration of these factors will also assist the court in framing the 
scope of a possible injunction. Further, analysis of these factors operates to func- 
tionally satisfy equity's requirements that a party must show both irreparable 
injury and an inadequate remedy at  law in order to receive injunctive relief. See 
Felter v. Cape Girardeau School Dist., 810 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Mo. 1993); Nike, 
Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
142. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04(a). 
143. See id. 5 5.04(b)(l); id. at  271; see also Moses H .  Cone Mem. Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1983) (suggesting that the stage of the 
proceedings in both the state and federal courts is relevant to the issue of whether 
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interference is directly related to the actual 
stage of litigation in both proceedings, the 
transferee court should determine the stage of 
litigation in both the federal and state 
courts . 144 
b. Issue C~mmonal i t~ : '~~  The court must 
assess the degree to which the consolidated 
and nonconsolidated actions involve similar, 
transactionally related claims. Interference 
will more likely be substantial when the two 
proceedings involve similar issues. '46 
c. Numerosity & Size: The court should 
determine the aggregate size of the 
nonconsolidated action, including the number 
of claims and the dollar amount of the damag- 
es sought. The degree of interference is di- 
rectly proportional to the overall size of the 
nonconsolidated proceeding. 14' 
2. Advancement of Efficiency & Fairness Poli- 
~ i e s : ' ~ ~  After measuring the scope of possible inter- 
the federal court should exercise its jurisdiction); Colorado River Water Conserv. 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-21 (1976) (same); Thompson v. Ashner, 
601 F. Supp. 471, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (same); cf: Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 
349 (1975) (holding that the Younger doctrine prohibits enjoining state court pro- 
ceedings when the state claim arises after the federal claim and there have not 
been "proceedings of substance" in the federal action). 
144. On the one hand, when the proceedings in both the consolidated and 
nonconsolidated courts are at  similar stages, the possibility for interference in the 
disposition of the consolidated case is conceivably substantial. See COMPLEX LITIGA- 
TION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 5.04 reporter's cmt. a at  264-65. On the other 
hand, when the proceedings in both courts are a t  radically different stages-as for 
example when the state proceeding has gone to the jury, and the consolidated 
action is just beginning discovery-the chance of the nonconsolidated action inter- 
fering in the disposition of the consolidated action is less likely. 
145. See id. $ 5.04(b)(2); see also id. reporter's notes to cmt. c a t  272. 
146. Moreover, analysis of issue commonality ensures that an injunction will 
only issue against proceedings that are transactionally related to the consolidated 
action. See id. 8 5.04(a). 
147. The likelihood of a nonconsolidated action impairing disposition of the 
consolidated action increases with the absolute size of the nonconsolidated action. A 
relatively large nonconsolidated action, e.g., a substantial class action or the filing 
of a bankruptcy petition by a tortfeasor confronted with multiple tort victims, 
might deprive the transferee court of an ability to effectively re-mediate and render 
justice for the parties in consolidated actions, thereby perpetuating the problems of 
complex cases the Proposal seeks to resolve. Cf: In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 
82 B 11, 656 to 82 B 11, 676 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982) (initiating bankruptcy 
proceeding to resolve outstanding tort claims); supra, part 1I.A. 
148. See COMPLEX LITIGATION l?ROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04(a); see also supra 
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ference, the transferee court should evaluate the fol- 
lowing factors to determine whether an injunction will 
promote the Proposal's efficiency and fairness objec- 
tives: 14' 
a. Case Progress:lw Efficiency and fairness 
policies are potentially better served when the 
decision to consolidate related claims and 
enjoin all nonconsolidated claims pending in 
state courts has been made at earlier, rather 
than later, stages of the  proceeding^.'^^ The 
transferee court should evaluate whether the 
consolidated proceedings have progressed 
beyond the point at  which significant gains in 
efficiency or litigant fairness might be 
achieved by an injunction. 
b. Issue Commonality: 152Efficiency and 
fairness policies are more likely to be ad- 
vanced by consolidation-voluntary or invol- 
untary-only when a significant number of 
common issues occur in both the consolidated 
and nonconsolidated actions. Consequently, 
the transferee court must evaluate the claims 
presented in both actions, considering both 
part 1I.C. (discussing policies served by the Proposal). 
149. The relative importance of such considerations as efficiency and fairness is 
suggested by the following comment made by the Reporter to the Complex Litiga- 
tion Proposal: "An antisuit injunction will be appropriate only when its issuance 
will advance the fairness and efficiency goals that underlie this complex litigation 
proposal . . . ." COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 5.04 reporter's 
notes to cmt. c a t  271 (emphasis added). 
150. See id. § 5.04 reporter's notes to cmt. c a t  271-72; see also In  re Repeti- 
tive Stress Injury Cases, 142 F.R.D. 584, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (suggesting that 
early consolidation maximizes beneficial resolution of claims while minimizing liti- 
gation costs). 
151. In discussing the benefits accruing from consolidation, Judge Weinstein, 
who himself has had considerable experience with complex litigation, concluded 
that "[elxperience with mass litigation indicates that courts are in the best position 
to minimize litigation costs and to help achieve satisfactory resolution of individual 
cases . . . through early consolidation." In  re Repetitive Stress Injury, 142 F.R.D. a t  
587. 
152. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2 $ 5.04(b)(2) reporter's 
notes to cmt. c a t  271-73; see also id.  5.04, a t  272; cf. Moses H. Cone Mem. 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (avoiding piecemeal litigation 
is a relevant factor when deciding whether to abstain in favor of a state court 
proceeding); Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
818 (1976) (same); Thompson v. Ashner, 601 F. Supp. 471, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1985) 
(same). 
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the level of similarity and the aggregate num- 
ber of such ~ 1 a i m s . l ~ ~  
Following examination of these factors, the court should 
determine whether they counsel against or in favor of enjoining 
the nonconsolidated proceeding. If the court concludes that an 
injunction would foster effective disposition of the consolidated 
action while promoting greater efficiency and fairness gains, it 
must then evaluate how an injunction would affect the 
nonconsolidated parties and whether principles of comity and 
federalism urge restraint. In answering these questions, the 
court should evaluate the following factors: 
1. Burden of an Injunction:lM The court should de- 
termine whether and to what extent an injunction 
would unduly burden the parties to the nonconsolidat- 
ed action. Consideration of the following factors may 
be helpful in making this determination: 
a. Stayed Nonconsolidated Proceedings: If 
the nonconsolidated proceeding has been 
stayed in favor of the consolidated action, an 
injunction may not need to issue, and, if is- 
sued, is unlikely to be unduly burden- 
some. 155 
b. Numerosity of Similar Issues: If the 
nonconsolidated proceedings share few com- 
mon issues with the consolidated action, it is 
more likely that the burden falling on the 
nonconsolidated parties will outweigh any 
benefits that an injunction would produce for 
either the consolidated parties or the consoli- 
dated proceeding. 
153. Although-theoretically-the magnitude of attainable efficiency and fair- 
ness gains would increase as more transactionally related claims were consolidated, 
a single significant, common issue might justify the issuance of an injunction. See 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 5.04 reporter's notes to cmt. c at  
272. 
154. Because traditional equitable principles suggest that a court should, prior 
to entering an injunction, balance both the benefits accruing from and the burdens 
arising out of an injunction, see Charles Schwab & Co. v. Hibernia Bank, 775 F. 
Supp. 800, 803 (N.D. Cal. 1987), courts should hesitate to issue injunctions whose 
burdens substantially outweigh their benefits. Requiring transferee courts to com- 
pare the burdens imposed on the party to be enjoined with the benefits accruing to 
the consolidated parties functionally satisfies the traditional equitable guideline. 
155. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1983), in 
which the Ninth Circuit concluded that a district court's continuing of its own 
proceedings was proper when competing state court proceedings had been stayed. 
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c. Party Excused from Cons~lidation:'~~ If 
the nonconsolidated action has been brought 
by a party who was excused from consolida- 
tion, the transferee court should be extremely 
hesitant to enjoin that party's proceeding. 
d. Case Progre~s: '~~ The court should con- 
sider: (i) the extent to which an injunction will 
unduly burden a party who has already in- 
vested substantial monetary resources and 
time in prosecuting his case in the nonconsol- 
idated action; and (ii) the extent to which that 
burden, albeit substantial, will be outweighed 
by benefits accruing from consolidation. 
e. Forum Inconvenience: 15' The court 
should evaluate the extent to which the loca- 
tion of the consolidated action represents an 
inconvenient, burdensome forum for the non- 
consolidated party, taking into account the 
present situs for adjudicating the party's 
claim, as well as the party's actual resources 
and the size of the party's overall claim.159 
g. Party Gamesmanship: The transferee 
court should assess the extent to which the 
nonconsolidated proceeding merely represents 
an attempt to avoid consolidation of a 
transactionally related ~1a i rn . l~~  
Comity & Federalism Restraints:l6l Lastly, the 
156. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, $ 5.04(b)(4); id. $ 5.04 
reporter's notes to cmt. c a t  273. 
157. See id. $ 5.04(b)(l); id. $ 5.04 reporter's notes to cmt. c at  271. 
158. Cf: Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 US. 1, 15 
(1983) (suggesting that an inconvenient federal forum may counsel federal ab- 
stention in favor of the state court proceeding); Colorado River Water Conserv. 
Dist. v. United States, 424 US. 800, 818 (1976) (same); Thompson v. Ashner, 601 
F. Supp 471, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (same). 
159. Compare Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Merkle-Korff Indus., 503 F. 
Supp 168 (D.N.H. 1980), in which a federal district court stayed its own proceeding 
in favor of a potentially more convenient state court proceeding located in Illinois. 
160. The court should be relatively free to enjoin claims refiled in state court 
after initial consolidation of the same claim in the federal transferee court. Cf: 
Moses H. Cone, 460 US. a t  17-18 n.20 (noting that there is "considerable merit" to 
a federal court's declining to stay its proceedings when evidence suggests that the 
state court proceeding is reactive or vexatious in nature). 
161. Because principles of comity and federalism represent fairly amorphous 
concepts-as compared with the more tangible factors counseling in favor of an 
10411 ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS 1077 
federal transferee court should assess whether general 
principles of comity and federalism, which federal 
courts have traditionally considered when reviewing a 
request for an injunction,lB2 would restrain the issu- 
ance of an injunction: 
a. Comity:lB3 The transferee court should 
evaluate the extent to which enjoining 
nonconsolidated state court proceedings will 
unnecessarily trammel the principle of non- 
interference by one court with another, in- 
crease the level of friction between the federal 
and state systems, and impair harmonious 
relations between courts constitutionally pos- 
sessing jurisdiction over the same subject 
matter.164 
b. F e d e r a l i ~ m : ' ~ ~  The transferee court 
should assess the extent to which enjoining 
nonconsolidated state court actions will ob- 
scure the constitutional line of demarcation 
between the state and federal judiciaries, 
undermine the constitutional independence of 
state courts, or otherwise impair the value 
and role of state courts under the Federal 
Constitution. 166 
injunction-a court must be extraordinarily cautious when examining and weighing 
these factors. See Brunet, supra note 9, a t  277 ("Efficiency principles are easy to 
apply; more ambiguous competing policies such as federalism and fairness are 
difficult to employ. In the hands of managerial judges comfortable with the in- 
creased discretion inherent in docket-reduction policies, efficiency concerns are like- 
ly to outweigh other less tangible and more subtle competing policies."). 
162. See supra notes 135, 136 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra part III.A.2. 
164. As with many factors employed by this proposed test, the stage of the 
nonconsolidated litigation proves relevant to evaluating this prong. Arguably, the 
farther advanced the state court proceedings, with concomitantly greater expendi- 
tures of state court resources, the greater the perceived, and perhaps actual, in- 
terference will be. When, however, the state court has barely commenced its pro- 
ceedings or has stayed its proceedings in favor of the federal consolidated proceed- 
ing, the impact of an injunction on comity-based values will be more minimal. 
165. See supra part III.A.2. 
166. Measuring an injunction's impact on fairly amorphous principles of feder- 
alism is, indubitably, difficult. Nevertheless, some relatively clear factors exist 
which may guide court consideration. For example, if the substantive law supplying 
the rule of decision is federal, the impact on federalism values will be less than if 
the law of decision is state based. Cf: Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1983) (suggesting that federal courts should be 
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After considering the import of these factors, the court 
should, in an exercise of its principled discretion, determine 
whether to enjoin the nonconsolidated pr0~eeding.l~~ If the 
calculus weighs in favor of declining to enjoin, the court should, 
and properly may, decline to enjoin the nonconsolidated ac- 
tion? Resolution of any doubts, of course, should be against 
an injun~tion. '~~ The process of weighing the considerations 
in favor of and against issuing an injunction reconciles the two 
potentially conflicting interests of (i) serving the policies under- 
lying the Proposal; and (ii) protecting the values underlying the 
Anti-Injunction Act. 
Traditional principles of discretion over the exercise of its 
jurisdiction perrnit a federal transferee court to decline to en- 
join state proceedings. Incorporating this principled discretion 
into the decisional schema proposed here permits a federal 
transferee court, when deciding whether to enjoin 
nonconsolidated proceedings, not only to protect principles of 
federalism and comity but also to promote the Proposal's 
overarching values of efficiency and litigant fairness. 
Litigating complex cases within the current adjudicatory 
structure produces potentially unjust results for plaintiffs and 
defendants, as well as transactional inefficiencies which result 
in wasted judicial, individual, and societal resources. As a 
means of alleviating these problems, the American Law Insti- 
tute proposes consolidating separate claims for unified treat- 
ment of their transactionally related issues. Consolidating 
separate complex cases through its Complex Litigation Propos- 
reluctant to abstain when federal law provides the rule of decision). Similarly, the 
relative significance of either a state or federal claim in the case will assist in 
evaluating the possible impact on federalism values. Lastly, a court may profitably 
consider whether important state interests are implicated by the litigation. To the 
extent they are, federalism principles counsel against issuing an injunction. 
167. As with most multiprong tests, the test proposed here fails to suggest 
whether one prong is more determinative than another. In some cases, one factor 
alone may be dispositive; in others, all factors may indicate the direction to be 
taken. 
168. See supra notes 135, 136 and accompanying text. Similarly, if these fac- 
tors counsel in favor of enjoining, the court should, and properly may, enjoin the 
nonconsolidated state action. 
169. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977); Atlantic 
Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970); 
Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. v. Webster, 796 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1986). 
ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS 
al, the Institute posits, will achieve the fair and efficient reso- 
lution of claims, thereby alleviating problems associated with 
complex litigation. However, because the contemporaneous 
adjudication of t ransact ional ly re la ted  claims i n  
nonconsolidated proceedings may prevent attainment of the 
Proposal's objectives, transferee courts processing consolidated 
claims must be able to enjoin those contemporaneous and 
transactionally related proceedings that threaten to prevent 
both the effectual disposition of consolidated claims and the 
attainment of the Proposal's overarching efficiency and fairness 
objectives. Transferee courts, including federal transferee 
courts, then, have been authorized under the terms of the Pro- 
posal to enjoin these potentially disruptive, nonconsolidated 
proceedings. 
However, federal courts have traditionally eschewed en- 
joining ongoing state court proceedings. Such restraint is man- 
dated both by the express terms of the Anti-Injunction Act and 
by judicial adherence to principles of comity and federalism. 
The policy of non-interference promotes increased harmony 
among federal and state courts, and preserves the constitution- 
al independence and significance of state courts within the 
federal system. Although the Proposal has structured its pro- 
posal so that antisuit injunctions fall within an exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act, a federal transferee court must still consid- 
er the principles of comity and federalism when deciding 
whether to issue an injunction. A federal transferee court, then, 
must work to reconcile the distinct demands of efficiency and 
fairness with those of comity and federalism. 
Reconciliation of efficiency and fairness objectives with 
principles of judicial comity and federalism avoids frustrating, 
on the one hand, the legitimate goal of alleviating the serious 
problems arising from complex litigation and, on the other 
hand, the constitutionally mandated autonomy of state courts. 
This reconciliation may be achieved through the principled 
exercise of judicial discretion over the grant of equitable reme- 
dies. Because federal courts possess broad discretion when 
deciding whether to grant an equitable remedy, a federal trans- 
feree court may use that discretion to reconcile efficiency and 
fairness concerns with federalism and comity interests, balanc- 
ing the one against the other, when deciding whether to enjoin 
a nonconsolidated state court proceeding. Thus, the analysis 
provided by this Comment will assist a federal transferee court 
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to harmonize the sirens' song of efficiency and fairness with the 
hymn of judicial federalism and comity. 
Paul W. Werner 
